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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed a variety of issues in the area of criminal law and proce-
dure. This survey will examine only the more significant cases and will dis-




In United States v. Rucinski" the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that
residents in mountain communities have a greater expectation of privacy
than do residents in other communities. 2 The defendants operated a logging
operation on national forest land in an isolated Colorado mountain valley.
A clandestine surveillance of the logging operation was conducted by agents
of the United States Forest Service from adjacent property. Using telescopic
equipment, the agents gathered evidence which indicated that the defend-
ants were depriving the government of the value of certain timber. The ap-
pellate court refused to suppress the evidence stating, "[w]e do not believe
that those living in the mountains of Colorado have a greater right to expec-
tations of privacy than do citizens in other parts of the country."
3
The court also rejected the argument that the surveillance of the com-
mercial property in the absence of a regulatory scheme authorizing warrant-
less searches was prohibited under Donovan v. Dewey.4 Noting that Donovan
held that warrantless "inspections of commercial property may be unreason-
able if not authorized by law or are unnecessar for the furtherance of federal inter-
ests," 5 the court concluded that the Forest Service had a legitimate interest
in protecting against theft of logs from a national forest.
B. Investigatory Stop
In UnitedStates v. Hart6 the Tenth Circuit held that an investigatory stop
of a motor home was justified even though there existed sufficient probable
cause and ample time to obtain a warrant. 7 Utah police assisted the FBI in
1. 658 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
2. The defendants argued that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a mountain
habitat "based on a heightened sense of privacy and a heightened respect for private property."
658 F.2d at 744.
3. Id at 746.
4. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
5. 658 F.2d at 745 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981) (emphasis in
original)).
6. 656 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1981).
7. Justification for a warrantless investigatory stop requires "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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a search for Jones, a federal fugitive hiding in a remote campsite. The de-
fendant Hart was believed to be an associate of Jones. An informant indi-
cated that Hart was holding a woman against her will. Utah deputies
discovered the campsite and Jones was apprehended. Jones' father-in-law,
present at the campsite, told the deputies that Hart had driven his camper
into town accompanied by a woman. While en route to town the deputies
observed a vehicle that matched the description of Hart's camper heading
towards the campsite. After confirming the description with Jones' father-
in-law, the deputies stopped the camper. The woman was questioned and,
with Hart's consent, the camper was searched. The woman was not being
held involuntarily; however, the search revealed twelve weapons which
formed the basis of Hart's prosecution.8
The district court suppressed the seizure of the weapons, reasoning that
probable cause to search the vehicle existed for several days providing ample
time for the deputies to obtain a warrant. The Tenth Circuit reversed, char-
acterizing the police action as an investigatory stop which merely requires
articulable reasons for believing a defendant to be engaged in criminal activ-
ity.9 The district court's finding of probable cause was then interpreted to
mean, afortiori, that such articulable reasons existed. The appellate court
also stated that the fact that Hart's vehicle was in transit constituted suffi-
cient exigent circumstances to justify an immediate search of the camper
pursuant to a lawful stop. t°
In United States v. MacDonaldt' the Tenth Circuit held that observations
by a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent could constitute suffi-
cient grounds to justify an investigatory stop. The defendant MacDonald
was traveling on a commercial airliner from Fort Lauderdale to Albuquer-
que via Dallas-Fort Worth. During the flight, MacDonald sat next to a
DEA agent who soon became suspicious of him. When the plane made its
stop in Dallas-Fort Worth, the agent alerted local DEA officials who, in turn,
notified the DEA in Albuquerque. Upon arriving in Albuquerque, Mac-
Donald was placed under surveillance. When he attempted to leave the
terminal without his luggage, he was questioned by Albuquerque police.
His answers conflicted with information supplied by the DEA agent. Mac-
Donald was detained while a cocaine-detecting dog inspected his luggage.
When the dog indicated that the defendant's luggage contained drugs, a
search warrant was obtained and cocaine was discovered. The defendant
sought to suppress this evidence contending that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop outside the
airport. 12
Judge Logan, writing for the Tenth Circuit, considered the confronta-
8. Hart was indicted on eleven counts of unlawful interstate transportation of firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 9 2 2(g), 924(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and two counts relating to
unlawful possession of a .45 caliber machine gun in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871 (1976).
656 F.2d at 596.
9. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981);see also su/ra note 7.
10. 656 F.2d at 600.
11. 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 373 (1982).
12. 670 F.2d at 911-12.
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tion outside the airport between the defendant and the police a Terry-type
stop' 3 which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to be justified.
He stated that "[i]n assessing whether the grounds for a stop were adequate,
courts should not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement of-
ficers have gained from their special training and expertise."'1 4 Noting that
the DEA agent had ten years of experience in drug enforcement activity,
Judge Logan found that the correspondence between the agent's knowledge
of the behavior patterns of drug smugglers and MacDonald's behavior was
sufficient to establish the necessary reasonable grounds for an investigatory
stop. 15
C. Timely Execution of Warrants
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of permissible delay in the execu-
tion of an arrest warrant in United States v. Drake. 16 The defendant Drake was
under investigation by agents of the Fish and Wildlife Service for suspected
violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Act).17 Undercover agents vis-
ited Drake's home and negotiated a sale of two flamingos in violation of the
Act. The agents arranged for delivery of the birds and payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase price to be made October 2, 1980. On October 1, 1980,
the agents swore out a complaint and obtained an arrest warrant. The fol-
lowing day the agents returned to Drake's residence. They took possession of
the flamingos and paid the balance of the purchase price. The agents then
identified themselves and made the arrest. The trial court granted Drake's
motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the agents had imper-
missibly delayed execution of the arrest warrant in order to complete the
purchase and strengthen their case.' 8
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the delay in the execution of the
warrant to be reasonable and the search to be incident to the arrest. The
court stated that arrest warrants need not be immediately executed and that
officers need not arrest at the first opportunity.' 9 The court noted that a
purposeful delay of execution intended to gain a tactical advantage not
otherwise attainable would be impermissible.20 The court, however, found
no such purpose to the delay.2 ' The court then observed that the arrest
could have been made without a warrant at the time of the transaction.
22
13. See supra note 7.
14. 670 F.2d at 913 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979); United States v. Lebya, 627
F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980)).
15. 670 F.2d at 913.
16. 655 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1981).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(b) (1976).
18. 655 F.2d at 1027. The defendant had also been granted a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on grounds of improper pretrial publicity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that there
was no showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id
19. Id (citing United States v. Joines, 258 F.2d 471, 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958)).
20. 655 F.2d at 1027 (citing McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
21. The warrant was executed one day after issuance and served within an hour after the
agents arrived at the defendant's home. 655 F.2d at 1027.
22. Id at 1028; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
1983]
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The Tenth Circuit reasoned that penalizing the agents for delaying execu-




In United States v. Madrid24 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the ques-
tion of whether testimony by a psychiatrist concerning statements made by
the defendant during examinations to determine his competency to stand
trial may be admitted at trial on the issue of sanity. The defendant was
arrested in connection with a bank robbery. The defense counsel requested,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244,25 that the defendant be given a psychiatric
examination. The defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and com-
mitted to a medical facility. Approximately eight months later, the trial
court granted the government's motion to order the defendant to submit to a
second psychological examination. The examiner, Dr. Dempsey, indicated
that the defendant was both competent to stand trial and sane at the time of
the alleged offense. After a hearing the trial court found the defendant com-
petent to stand trial.
2 6
At trial the defendant raised the insanity defense. The government
then moved, pursuant to rule 12.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,2 7 for an examination to be conducted by the same psychiatrist who
had conducted the second competency exam for the purpose of determining
the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. The defendant did not
object. Dr. Dempsey testified that the defendant was sane at the time of the
alleged offense. He based his opinion, in part, on statements made by the
defendant during the section 4244 competency examination concerning pre-
vious involvement in armed robberies to support a heroin addiction. The
defendant was found guilty and appealed. He contended that Dr. Demp-
sey's testimony concerning the prior criminal behavior should have been ex-
23. 655 F.2d at 1028.
24. 673 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 96 (1982).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) provides:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the United States
Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense . . .
may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to un-
derstand the proceedings against him or properly assist in his own defense, he shall file
a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused ....
[T]he accused [shall] be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified
psychiatrist . . . . No statement made by the accused in the course of any examina-
tion into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the
examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in
evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding. A find-
ing by the judge that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial shall in no way
prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense to the crime charged; such
finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to
the notice of the jury.
26. 673 F.2d at 1117.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) deals with the defense based on mental condition and pro-
vides in part: "In an appropriate case the court, may upon motion of the attorney for the
government, order the defendant to submit to a psychiatrist designated for this purpose in the
order of the court."
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cluded under both section 4244 and the fifth amendment.2 8
Section 4244 prohibits the use of any statement made during a compe-
tency examination from later being used at trial against the accused on the
issue of guilt. 29 However, the Tenth Circuit held that by failing to object to
the government's use of Dr. Dempsey as the examiner in the rule 12.2(c)
sanity examination, the defendant waived his right to exclude statements
made to Dr. Dempsey at the earlier section 4244 competency examination.
30
The court believed it would be unreasonable to expect the doctor not to
consider statements made in his earlier contact with the defendant.3 1 The
court would not go so far as to decide whether a defendant, by giving notice
of an insanity defense under rule 12.2(a), waives section 4244 protections.
Instead, the court limited its ruling to the defendant's failure to object to
undergoing the examination with the same psychiatrist.
3 2
The court then held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not prohibit the government from using the defendant's
statements.3 3 The court distinguished Estelle v. Smith3 4 which prevents the
use of statements made during pretrial competency examinations when the
defendant has neither been informed of his right to remain silent nor warned
of the possible adverse use which may be made of his statements. In Madrid,
however, the issues of competence and sanity were raised by the defendant.
3 5
After Madrid, it appears in the Tenth Circuit that the fifth amendment pro-
tection of Estelle is limited to cases where the pretrial examination is
involuntary.
The Tenth Circuit extended fifth amendment protection to hearings on
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction in Crisp v. Mayabb. 36 In 1971, Mayabb pled
guilty to a murder which occurred when he was seventeen years old. The
plea was entered under an Oklahoma statute37 which treated males over the
age of sixteen as adults. Under that statute, a female aged sixteen to eight-
een was treated as a juvenile unless, after a certification hearing it was deter-
mined that she should be tried as an adult. The Tenth Circuit declared the
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.3 8 The court ruled that
male prisoners convicted under the statute were entitled to a determination
of whether they would have been certified as adults had the type of hearing
previously afforded only female defendants been held.3 9 At Mayabb's hear-
ing, a statement which he made at the time of his arrest was suppressed on
fifth amendment grounds. Without that statement the state was unable to
28. 673 F.2d at 1117-19.
29. See supra note 25.
30. 673 F.2d at 1120.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id at 1121.
34. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
35. 673 F.2d at 1121.
36. 668 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Fields v. Paul M., 103 S. Ct. 62 (1982).
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § I101(a) (Supp. 1969).
38. 668 F.2d at 1129 (citing Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972)).
39. 668 F.2d at 1130-31 (citing Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denid, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)).
19831
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show that adult certification would have occurred. 4°
The Tenth Circuit upheld the suppression of the statement. The court
noted that the Supreme Court had applied the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to juveniles41 and had recognized the importance
of such certification hearings.4 2 The court then held that "a confession or
admission of a juvenile is not admissible in a hearing on waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction unless the statement was made voluntarily and with knowledge
of constitutional rights.43
The court ruled that Mayabb could not have knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his rights at the time of the arrest. Although his mother was
present and a Miranda warning was read, both Mayabb and his mother were
unable to read or write and were incapable of comprehending the oral state-
ment of rights. The Tenth Circuit decided that Mayabb's confession was
properly suppressed 44 and affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus directing the release of Mayabb.
4 5
B. Double Jeopardy
In Wilkett o. United Slates4 6 the court addressed the issues of whether
jeopardy attaches in a dismissal for lack of venue and the time at which
jeopardy attached in conspiracy prosecutions. Wilkett, Hoover, and Conklin
were charged with participating in a statewide conspiracy to distribute a
controlled substance and tried in the Western District of Oklahoma. Conk-
lin and Hoover moved to dismiss the indictments against them for lack of
venue. The government failed to prove their involvement in a conspiracy in
the Western District and the trial court granted the motions.
47
Wilkett, however, was convicted. The government then filed charges
against all three defendants in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. These
charges were essentially identical to those brought in the Western District.
The defendants interposed double jeopardy contentions, claiming the previ-
ous Western District prosecution barred further prosecution.48
Hoover and Conklin urged that the "same evidence test" of United States
v. Martinez49 barred the action in the Eastern District because the Western
District had already heard evidence of the same activities for which they had
been re-indicted. 50 Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, rejected that
argument. He reasoned that the dismissal for lack of venue, though based
on evidence presented at trial, was a procedural matter as opposed to a deci-
40. 668 F.2d at 1134.
41. Id (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
42. 668 F.2d at 1134 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 41 (1966)).
43. 668 F.2d at 1134.
44. Id at 1135.
45. Id at 1136.
46. 655 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
47. 655 F.2d at 1009.
48. Id
49. 562 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977).
50. 655 F.2d at 1011. The test for determining whether the offenses charged in two indict-
ments are identical is whether the facts alleged in one, if offered in support of the other, would
sustain a conviction. See Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 1948).
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sion on the merits. Judge Doyle noted that the motions to dismiss were
brought by the defendants, who could have chosen to waive venue and pro-
ceed with an adjudication on the merits. Thus, the court held that jeopardy
does not attach when a motion to dismiss is granted for lack of venue. 5 '
The court then turned to the conspiracy charge against Wilkett. The
court acknowledged that the "same evidence test" may be somewhat inade-
quate in the area of conspiracy because conspiracies often involve numerous
acts committed over an extended period of time, and it is sometimes possible
to show the same conspiracy through proof of more than one set of facts.
5 2
The "same evidence test" must be supplemented to insure that a defendant
is not prosecuted twice for participating in a single conspiracy. Therefore,
the court examined both the indictments and the evidence to be presented.
Wilkett was indicted for conspiracy in the Eastern District for essentially the
same activities which served as the basis for his previous indictment and,
because the government proffered no new evidence in the second action, the
court ordered the indictment dismissed.
53
In United States v. Martinez,54 a case involving allegations of prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct, Judges Lay, Gibson, and Bright of the Eighth Cir-
cuit sat by designation in what had become a politically charged case. The
defendant, Martinez, had been indicted on several counts relating to posses-
sion of unregistered explosives and sending explosives through the United
States mails. Before trial, four counts were severed and Martinez was tried
on the remaining counts before Chief Judge Winner of the District of Colo-
rado. The trial was conducted in an extremely tense atmosphere. Two ju-
rors openly complained about the conduct and apparel worn by spectators
and members of the defense team.
55
After the third day of trial, Judge Winner met secretly with the prosecu-
tion to discuss the atmosphere of intimidation which he felt pervaded the
courtroom. The defense counsel was neither invited to attend nor informed
of the meeting. As justification for this action, Judge Winner suggested the
possibility of the defense counsel's involvement in a conspiracy to intimidate
the jury. The judge offered to grant a mistrial to the prosecution and pro-
posed that such a motion be delayed until after the defense had presented its
case so that hidden cameras could be installed to record the alleged intimi-
dation. The judge offered to provoke a mistrial if necessary.
56
The following morning, however, the government was willing to accede
to a mistrial motion, citing publicity about the jurors' complaints. The de-
fense joined the motion which was then granted.
5 7
At retrial, Martinez filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of double
jeopardy. Judge Kane of the United States District Court, District of Colo-
rado, presiding over the retrial, denied the motion. On appeal, the case was
51. 655 F.2d at 1012.
52. Id. at 1013-14.
53. Id at 1015.
54. 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2301 (1982).
55. 667 F.2d at 887-88.




partially remanded to Judge Eubanks, United States District Court Judge
for the Western District of Oklahoma, for further evidentiary hearings. At
these hearings the nature and substance of Judge Winner's secret meeting
was revealed.
58
The defense moved to dismiss all seven of the original counts. Judge
Eubanks found that "the defendant was induced or lead [sic] into confessing,
stipulating to, or agreeing to a mistrial motion without the benefit of all the
facts" 59 and held that the defense did not knowingly consent to the motion
for mistrial. The judge dismissed the three severed counts on double jeop-
ardy grounds but refused to dismiss the remaining four counts. Both sides
appealed. 6°
The double jeopardy clause bars retrial if bad faith conduct by the pros-
ecutor or judge provokes the defendant into requesting a mistrial.6 1 The
appellate panel found that the prosecutorial and judicial misconduct was
more than sufficient to bar retrial. Jeopardy attached, but only to three of
the seven counts.
62
The defendant sought dismissal of the four remaining counts based on
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, citing the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen v. Benefial Industrial Loan Corp. 6 3 and Abney v. United States.64 The Co-
hen doctrine permits review of certain interlocutory orders drawn from "that
small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and col-
lateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."'65 Three factors are
used to determine whether a decision is "final" for review. First, the order
must fully dispose of the matter, not leaving it "open, unfinished or inconclu-
sive." 66 Second, the order must resolve an issue completely collateral to the
cause of action and not be simply a "step toward final disposition of the
merits of the case."' 67 Third, the decision must involve an important right
which would be irreparably damaged if review were postponed until after
judgment. 68
The Tenth Circuit held that the order failed two of the three prerequi-
sites. It found that "[t]he issues--primarily the question of prejudice-are
not 'completely collateral' to a decision on the merits and [the] defendant's
right will not be irreparably infringed if review has to await a final judg-
ment."'69  Thus, the court refused to extend Cohen to cases involving
58. Id
59. Id at 889.
60. Id
61. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 485 n.12 (1971).
62. 667 F.2d at 890.
63. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
64. 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (applying the doctrine to a denial of a motion to dismiss based on
double jeopardy).




69. 667 F.2d at 890.
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prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, reserving it for "exceptional cases."70
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Confront Witnesses
In United States v. Rothbart7" the Tenth Circuit held that the sixth
amendment's assurance of the right to confront witnesses requires that the
government make an affirmative effort to ensure that its witnesses are avail-
able for trial. Rothbart was indicted for failing to file employment tax re-
turns. The government's case required the testimony of Mitchell, a former
employee, who was subpoenaed to appear at trial. Mitchell's employment
required him to be out of the country during that time. As a result, the
prosecution arranged to take his deposition even though a court order was
never issued permitting it. The defense counsel attended the deposition and
cross-examined Mitchell.
72
At trial before a magistrate, the defense objected to the admission of the
deposition as a violation of both rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure7 3 and the sixth amendment. On appeal to the district court,
Judge Finesilver of the District of Colorado ruled that although rule 15 was
not strictly complied with, "compliance [was] within the spirit and tenor" of
the rule.
74
The Tenth Circuit, unpersuaded by Judge Finesilver's reasoning, held
that the government's failure to retain a present witness deprived Rothbart
of his sixth amendment right of confrontation.7 5 The court applied the two-
pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts 76 which requires the prosecution first to
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant and then show the statement
to be trustworthy. 77 Focusing on the availability of the witness, the court
followed Barber v. Page78 which holds that the previous testimony of a wit-
ness, whether or not subjected to cross-examination, is admissible only if "the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence
at trial."'79 The court found that, rather than making a good faith effort to
obtain Mitchell's presence, the government assisted in releasing him from
the subpoena.80
In Valenzuela v. Griffin8l the defendant was tried for burglary. The gov-
ernment's witness was subpoenaed and a bench warrant was issued. The
only other evidence of the state's effort to produce the witness was the prose-
cutor's statement that the state "had been looking for her."'8 2 The defendant
70. Id
71. 653 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1981).
72. Id at 463.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
74. 653 F.2d at 464.
75. Id at 465.
76. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
77. Id. at 65.
78. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
79. Id at 725.
80. 653 F.2d at 466.
81. 654 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1981).
82. Id at 710.
1983]
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was convicted and sought habeas corpus relief, contending that the trial
court violated the sixth amendment by allowing the introduction of the wit-
ness' tape recorded testimony which had been made at a preliminary
hearing.
8 3
The Tenth Circuit again applied the "good faith" standard8 4 of Ohio .
Roberts and Barber v. Page and found the prosecution's effort to be inade-
quate. Noting a three-month time span between the issuance of the sub-
poena and the trial date, the court held that "good faith" required evidence
of additional steps by the government to secure the presence of the witness at
trial.
8 5
B. Efective Assistance of Counsel
The Tenth Circuit held that adequate time to prepare a defense is a
right of the accused under the sixth amendment in United States v. King86 and
United States v. Cronzc.3 7 In King the defendant was indicted for income tax
evasion following a three-year investigation. He was arraigned on December
11, 1979 and trial was set for January 7, 1980. The defendant's motions for a
continuance were denied even though his attorney was forced to withdraw
and new counsel was not appointed until December 26, 1979. After an
eight-day trial involving approximately 200 witnesses and 5,000 exhibits,
King was convicted. 88
Judge Seymour, writing for the court, recognized that a criminal de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel may be jeopardized by inad-
equate trial preparation. 9 In determining whether the court-induced lack
of preparation time deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment rights,9°
the court applied the factors articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Woos v.
Britton9 ' and adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Golub. 92 These
factors include: " '(1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation;
(2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity
of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel.' -93 Ap-
plying the facts, the court in King found that the defendant had only twenty-
seven days to prepare a defense to charges that were three years in the mak-
ing; that the case was sophisticated and required extensive pretrial prepara-
tion; that the defendant faced a prison term of up to five years; and that the
defendant had only fifteen days to meet with his new counsel before the
trial.94 The court held that these factors combined to violate the defendant's
83. Id at 708-09.
84. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
85. 654 F.2d at 710-11.
86. 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No.
82-660).
88. 664 F.2d at 1172.
89. Id at 1172-73 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
90. See Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
91. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
92. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. King, 664 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Golub v. United States, 638 F.2d 185, 189 (10th Cir.
1980)).
94. 664 F.2d at 1173.
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sixth amendment rights. 9 5
In United States v. Cronic96 the defendant was indicted on mail fraud
charges. The government's case involved seventeen witnesses and over fifty
exhibits. The defendant had twenty-five days to prepare for trial and was
represented by a court-appointed attorney with virtually no experience in
federal criminal matters. The appellate court applied the Golub9 7 test and
concluded that inadequate preparation time denied the defendant effective
assistance of counsel.98
C. Speedy Trial
The defendants in United States v. Torres99 were arrested by local police
in connection with a bank robbery. They consented to a search of their
vehicle by local authorities.10° A small caliber weapon was found in the
door pouch. 10 1 Weapons were also found on the persons of both defend-
ants. 10 2  While in custody, one of the defendants consented to a further
search of the vehicle.l0 3 That search revealed stolen cash and the wallet of a
robbery victim. 10 4 F.B.I. agents participated in the interrogation of the de-
fendants and the search of the automobile while the defendants were in state
custody. 10 5 Five days after the arrest, federal charges were filed and the
defendants were taken before a magistrate the following day.'0 6 They ap-
pealed their subsequent convictions contending that there was undue delay
between the time of their arrest and an appearance before a magistrate.
10 7
Arguing that the evidence seized from the automobile during that delay
should be suppressed, the defendants cited McNabb v. United States 108 and
Mallory v. United States 109 which require federal courts to exclude confessions
obtained during such a period of undue delay. The principle was adopted in
rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. " 10 Rule 5(a) applies
95. Id
96. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No.
82-660).
97. United States v. Golub, 638 F,2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying
notes 92-93.
98. 675 F.2d at 1129.
99. 663 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2237 (1982).








108. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
109. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides:
(a) In General. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a com-
plaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the
event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judi-
cial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041. If a person arrested without a warrant is
brought before a magistrate, a complaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply
with the requirements of Rule 4(a) with respect to the showing of probable cause.
When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a summons, appears ini-
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when the accused is taken into federal custody. The challenged search, how-
ever, occurred while the defendants were in state custody. The court, there-
fore, required the defendants to show that a "working arrangement"
'
existed between the F.B.I. and the police in order to tack the period of state
custody to that of the federal government. The defendants were also re-
quired to show that such state custody was used to circumvent rule 5(a).'
1 2
The court found no evidence of such a collusive arrangement. It noted that
it is neither "suspicious [n]or irregular for both state and federal officials to
investigate the same suspect, and to cooperate in the solution of a crime."
'1 13
As an alternative basis for its decision, the court held that the defend-
ants failed to show that the discovery of the evidence resulted from the delay.
The defendants were interrogated and consented to the search of their vehi-
cle on the same day as the arrest. Although the evidence was found three
days later, it was not based on consent given under duress caused by the
delay. 14
In United States v. Guerrero115 the defendant was charged with assaulting
a member of Congress after throwing eggs at John Anderson during his pres-
idential campaign. The attack occurred on August 14, 1980 and trial was
scheduled for September 29. On September 26, the trial judge granted the
government's motion for a forty-five day continuance due to the unavailabil-
ity of Congressman Anderson as a witness until the conclusion of the Presi-
dential campaign. On October 6, the judge postponed the trial until
December 8.116 The defendant was subsequently convicted. He appealed,
contending that the 101 day span between the arraignment and trial vio-
lated the seventy-day time limit of the Speedy Trial Act. 17 The defendant
argued that the initial order postponing the trial did not adequately specify
the reasons for granting the continuance as required by the Act." 8
Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, conceded that the order was
"cryptic."" 9 Nevertheless, he found that the facts were presented in the
government's motion for a continuance and, because they were so obvious, it
was not necessary under the circumstances for the judge to repeat them in
his order. 12
0
In a forceful dissent Judge McKay stressed the importance of enforcing
the Speedy Trial Act. He observed that Congress realized that the Act
tially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall proceed in accordance with the appli-
cable subdivisions of this rule.
111. 663 F.2d at 1024. For an example of a working arrangement between federal and state
officials, see Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
112. 663 F.2d at 1024. See United States v. Rose, 415 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 396
U.S. 971 (1969); Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1967).
113. 663 F.2d at 1025.
114. Id In Part III of its opinion, the court rejected the defendant's contention that his
consent to a "complete" search of the vehicle did not contemplate the extensive search that was
undertaken. The court stated that "permission to search contemplates a thorough search." Id
at 1026-27.
115. 667 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 102 S. Ct. 2044 (1982).
116. 667 F.2d at 866.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
118. 667 F.2d at 865.
119. Id at 866.
120. Id at 867.
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places a heavy burden on trial judges and prosecutors and stated that "[o]nly
vigilance by Courts of Appeals can prevent the erosion of the congressional
mandate without Congress' consent."' 12 He concluded with the "hope that
this case will be confined to its peculiar facts and will not be the harbinger of
an eventual erosion of this important statute rooted in constitutional
imperatives."'
22
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Conspiracy
In United States v. Radeker' 23 the Tenth Circuit examined an exception to
the hearsay rule which allows statements made in the course of and in fur-
therance of a conspiracy to be admitted into evidence. At trial, after estab-
lishing that Radeker helped manage a fence company, the prosecutor asked
a witness how Radeker planned to replace one of the head men in the com-
pany. The defense objected to the response as hearsay. 24 The prosecutor
argued that the testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception be-
cause it was made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy. The
judge permitted the testimony; however, he made no determination that a
conspiracy existed or that the statement was made during the course of and
in furtherance of a conspiracy.
125
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that the testimony should not have
been permitted. The court relied on its previous interpretations of rule 104
of the Federal Rules of Evidence 126 in United States v. Andrews 1 27 and United
States v. Petersen. 128 Andrews held that such hearsay statements are inadmissi-
ble "unless the existence of the conspiracy is established by independent evi-
dence."i 29 Petersen held that the testimony is inadmissible unless the trial
judge determines that the prosecution has established that a conspiracy ex-
isted, that the declarant and the defendant participated in it, and that the
statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 1
30
In Radeker, the Tenth Circuit held that when a defendant properly objects to
hearsay testimony, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution
has met the burden of proof required in Andrews regardless of whether the
defendant has requested that such a finding be made.
13 1
Chief Judge Seth dissented, arguing that the defendant should not be
permitted to base an appeal on the trial court's failure to make a specific
finding of conspiracy when a ruling on the hearsay objection was all that was
121. Id at 869 (McKay, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 870.
123. 664 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1981).
124. Id at 246.
125. Id
126. FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b).
127. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978). For a brief review of Andrews, see Criminal Law and
Procedure, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Suvey, 57 DEN. L.J. 229, 260 (1980).
128. 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979),cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
129. 585 F.2d at 966.
130. 611 F.2d at 1327.
131. 664 F.2d at 244.
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necessary.' 32 He noted that the defendant had the responsibility to request
the specific finding either before or after the objection or after the trial judge
had made his ruling. 133 Citing the Tenth Circuit opinion in United States v.
Brewer,134 Chief Judge Seth stated that the issue of whether the court must
make a specific finding should be raised at trial, not on appeal. 135
B. Armed Robbegy and Assault
In United States v. Crouthers ' 36 the defendant, Crouthers, planned to rob
the Aurora National Bank in Aurora, Colorado.' 37 He convinced Trimm,
his former student, to pretend to hold him up at gun point on the night he
planned to be with Salski, a friend who was employed by the Wells Fargo
Security Co. and whom Crouthers knew had access to the bank keys. Prior
to the encounter, Crouthers gave Trimm a loaded gun and instructed him to
keep it aimed at him during the holdup so that Salski would not become
suspicious of his involvement. 3 Trimm cooperated and threatened the men
with the gun which, unknown to Crouthers, was unloaded. Crouthers told
Salski that there was a gun in his back. Trimm told Salski that if he cooper-
ated and helped break into the bank no one would get hurt. Salski obeyed
and the plan was carried out.
139
After interviewing Salski and Crouthers, the F.B.I. searched Crouthers'
apartment. Evidence was found linking Crouthers to the robbery. Trimm
was subsequently arrested and his testimony led to Crouthers' conviction for
armed bank robbery. 140
On appeal, Crouthers argued that the evidence did not support a con-
viction for assault with a dangerous weapon because Salski never saw the
gun and the gun was not loaded. The Tenth Circuit adopted the test estab-
lished in United States v. Beasley. 14 ' The Beasley test as applied to Crouthers
was "whether Salski perceived the situation as involving a dangerous
weapon and, if so, whether the perception was reasonable."' 142 The court
found that Salski reasonably perceived his life to be in danger based on his
132. Id. at 248 (Seth, C.J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "[i]t seems apparent that had the
defendant really wanted anything more than a bare ruling on his hearsay objection as he now
urges he would have asked for it." Id.
133. Id
134. 630 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1980). This case held that when a defendant fails to object to
procedural omissions at the trial or on appeal, reversal is unwarranted unless a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" would result. Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145,
150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980)).
135. 664 F.2d at 248.
136. 669 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1982).
137. Id at 638.
138. Id
139. Id at 639.
140. Id at 638.
141. 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). Beasl requires that the
evidence show the defendant "(a) to have created an apparently dangerous situation,
(b) intended to intimidate his victim to a degree greater than the mere use of language,
(c) which does, in fact, place his victim in reasonable expectation of death or serious bodily
injury . 438 F.2d at 1282. In applying this test, the Beastey court held that regardless of
the robber's ability to actually inflict harm on the victim, if the victim is in fact shown to be
apprehensive of the circumstances an assault conviction is warranted. Id. at 1283.
142. 669 F.2d at 639.
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belief that Trimm possessed a loaded gun.14 3
C. Illegal Gambling
In United States v. Boss ,144 the defendant was tried for conducting illegal
dice games at a private club in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.14 5 The evi-
dence showed that the defendant and another man managed the club. In
addition to the managers, the club employed two croupiers, one of whom
participated in managing the gambling business, and three cocktail wait-
resses. 146 The defendant moved for a directed verdict contending that the
government failed to prove that five or more persons were involved in the
management of the operation as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1955(c). 14 7 The
motion was denied and the defendant was convicted.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the prosecution had indeed
failed to satisfy the requirements of section 1955(c). The court rejected the
prosecution's argument that the cocktail waitresses should be included in the
count, stating that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they "per-
formed functions necessary to the illegal gambling business."' 148 The court
found that their relationship to the business was too attenuated to fall under
the provisions of section 1955 and was not in accordance with congressional
intent. 1
49
The Tenth Circuit thus narrowed the scope of section 1955 to include
only those persons necessary to the gambling business. It refused to allow
the statute to encompass those merely helpful to the operations because to do
so would exceed congressional intent.
150
D. Transmission of Radio Sgnals
In United States o. Brown , 1 5 1 Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) agents intercepted powerful radio signals which were being transmit-
ted from Brown's home in Colorado. After obtaining a warrant to search the
residence, the agents confiscated a radio transmitter, amplifiers, and miscel-
laneous equipment capable of transmitting signals over one hundred miles.
143. Id
144. 671 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1982).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976) provides that "[w]hoever conducts, finances, manages, su-
pervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id § 1955(c) provides that:
If five or more persons conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part
of a gambling business and such business operates for two or more successive days,
then, for the purpose of obtaining warrants for arrests, interceptions, and other
searches and seizures, probable cause that the business receives gross revenue in excess
of $2,000 in any single day shall be deemed to have been established.
146. 671 F.2d at 401.
147. &e supra note 145.
148. 671 F.2d at 402.
149. Id
150. For the same reasons the waitresses were not included as conductors of illegal gambling
business, the court held that the bartender, back-up bartender, doorwoman, and band members
could not be counted. The owners of the building who had leased the club could not be
counted without proof of their actual participation or actual financial contributions to the oper-
ations. Id
151. 661 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.),cert dmied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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Brown was charged with making radio transmissions that "did extend" be-
yond the state line in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d). 15 2 At trial, the agents
testified that the transmission wattage on Brown's citizen's band transmitter
was greater than that permitted by the FCC and that the transmissions
"could have crossed state borders or interfered with interstate radio sig-
nals."' 153 No evidence was presented that the signals actually interfered with
interstate transmissions or crossed the state line. The jury was instructed
that the defendant could be convicted if the effects of the radio transmission
"extend or could extend beyond the borders of the state of Colorado.' 54
Based on this evidence, Brown was convicted.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction, holding that evidence which
shows that radio signals are "powerful enough" to cross state borders is suffi-
cient to satisfy the effects test of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d).' 5 5 The court reasoned
that, because the intent of the statute is to provide the government with
plenary power over all channels of interstate radio transmissions, the govern-
ment need not prove that the signals "actually" extend beyond the state
border. '
56
Judge McKay dissented, distinguishing between broadcasts that "did
extend" across the state line and those that did not.' 5 7 Looking at the plain
meaning of subsection 301(d), Judge McKay found that Congress did not
intend to regulate those broadcasts which "could extend" past state bor-
ders.' 58 He concluded that, although the defendant was properly charged
under the "effects test," the addition of the words "or could extend" to the
jury instructions was reversible error.' 59 In Judge McKay's view, the major-
ity's affirmance of the conviction "greatly expand[s] criminal jurisdiction in
the face of a contrary congressional intent and [is] counter to the obvious
purposes apparent in the general structure of the statutory scheme."' 16
E. Malicious Damage
The defendant in United States v. Pouwos161 was charged with the destruc-
tion of a building and personal property with explosives in violation of 18
152. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) provides in part:
No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or commu-
nications or signals by radio . . . (d) within any State when the effects of such use
extend beyond the borders of said State, or when interference is caused by such use or
operation with the transmission of such energy, communications, or signals from
within said State to any place beyond its borders, or from any place beyond its borders
153. 661 F.2d at 855.
154. Id. at 857.
155. d. at 856; see supra note 152. The appellate court determined that an onerous burden
would be imposed upon the government if, in order to prove that every signal actually extended
across the border, it was required to monitor the signals from outside the state.
156. 661 F.2d at 856.
157. Id. at 857 (McKay, J., dissenting).
158. d. The dissent cited Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) as incor-
rectly interpreting the language of subsection 301 (d) to allow Congress to regulate all broadcasts
by citizen's band radios whether intra- or interstate. 661 F.2d at 857 n.2 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id at 857.
160. Id
161. 667 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1982).
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U.S.C. § 844(i).' 62 At trial, the defendant contended that 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(j), 16 3 which defines "explosives," is void for vagueness. He argued that
the statute fails to warn potential defendants of the criminal nature of their
conduct and that reasonable men would have to "guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."1 6 4 The defendant stated that the building was
not destroyed by an explosive, as defined in the statute, but rather by a
device consisting of two glass bottles filled with styrofoam and gasoline. 165
Furthermore, the gasoline was ignited by sparks from the pilot light of a
water heater in the building, not by an explosive igniting device. The trial
court refused to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal or to
strike the indictment, and the defendant was convicted. 166
The Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction, ruling that section 8440)
must be broadly construed to include all types of explosives, even those not
specified.16 7 The court stated that it is common knowledge that gasoline is a
highly combustible substance that fits within the meaning of "explosives."'68
F. Sentencing
1. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
In United States v. Montoya16 9 the trial court determined the defendant
should serve concurrent sentences on the four counts of his conviction. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions for assaulting a federal
law enforcement agent with a dangerous weapon 170 and possessing an unre-
gistered firearm.' 
7'
The prosecution asked the Tenth Circuit to affirm the remaining two
convictions 172 by applying the concurrent sentence doctrine.' 73 The prose-
cution argued that even if a ruling on the remaining two convictions would
162. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976). This section penalizes anyone who "maliciously damages or
destroys or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building. . . or other
real or personal property used in interstate commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce." Id
163. Id § 844(j) (1976). An "explosive" is defined as:
gunpowders, powders used for blasting, all forms of high explosives, blasting materials,
fuses (other than electric circuit breakers), detonators, and other explosive or incendi-
ary devices within the meaning of paragraph (5) of section 232 of this title, and any
chemical compounds, mechanical mixture, or device that contains any oxidizing and
combustible units, or other ingredients, in such proportions, quantities, or packing
that ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the
compound, mixture, or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion.
164. 667 F.2d at 941.
165. Id at 940-41.
166. Id at 941.
167. Id at 942.
168. Id
169. 676 F.2d 428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 124 (1982).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). This section provides "[w]hoever forcibly assaults, resists, op-
poses, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title
while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties shall be fined."
171. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976). This statute section prohibits any person "to receive or
possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and
transfer record .. "
172. The defendant was convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (1976) which prohibits one
from receiving or possessing "a firearm which is not identified by a serial number as required by
this chapter. ... The defendant was also convicted under the Omnibus Crime Control and
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be in the defendant's favor, the sentences under the first two convictions
would not change. The court refused to apply the doctrine, stating that the
issues on the remaining counts were "uncomplicated."' 1 74 The court cited
Benton v. Maryland'75 to support its conclusion that application of the doc-
trine is a discretionary matter.
The court noted that strong criticism has been directed toward applica-
tion of the doctrine due to the chance of "adverse collateral conse-
quences."' 76 It further noted that different approaches to this question have
arisen in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and in the District of Columbia and
Fifth Circuits.' 77 The Tenth Circuit rejected the District of Columbia and
Fifth Circuit approach which would have vacated the convictions on the
remaining counts. Instead, the court reaffirmed its discretionary authority
not to apply the doctrine.1
78
2. Youth Corrections Act
In Watts v. Hadden 179 the Tenth Circuit issued a two-part opinion con-
cerning the requirements of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA). 180
Eleven inmates of the Federal Correctional Institution in Colorado com-
plained that the United States Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and the United
States Parole Commission (Commission) failed to follow the provisions of the
YCA. They argued that inmates sentenced under the YCA should be segre-
gated from non-YCA offenders and placed in a facility designed and oper-
ated under the provisions of the YCA.' 8 ' The district court determined that
the petitioners were being held at the institution in violation of the YCA and
ordered the Bureau to draft a plan in compliance with the YCA
provisions. '
8 2
The Bureau's plan provided the YCA offenders with separate living
Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 1202(a), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (1976)).
173. The concurrent sentence doctrine states that "if any one of the counts is good and
warrants the judgment, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the
presumption of the law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only." United
States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
174. 676 F.2d at 433.
175. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
176. 676 F.2d at 432. See also United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 933-34 n.17 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972) ("[Tihe vitality of the concurrent sentence doctrine is
rapidly waning.").
177. 676 F.2 at 432-33. The Seventh Circuit considers the validity of all challenged counts
rather than applying the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d
128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). The Sixth Circuit assumes the existence of
adverse consequences in its refusal to apply the doctrine. See, e.g., Gentry v. United States, 533
F.2d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit appears to have adopted the D.C. Circuit's
practice of vacating the conviction on the additional counts where the concurrent sentence doc-
trine is applied. See United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 891-96 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 605-06 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
178. 676 F.2d at 433. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir.), vacatedon otherground sub noa. Schreiner
v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971).
179. 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981).
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 to 5026 (1976).
181. 651 F.2d at 1362.
182. 469 F. Supp. 223, 235 (D. Colo. 1979), aftd, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981).
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quarters and special treatment programs.' 8 3 At all other times the YCA
inmates would associate with the other inmates. The district court found the
Bureau's plan inadequate and ordered that the YCA inmates be completely
segregated.'8 4  The Bureau appealed, arguing that section 5011 of the
YCA18 5 gives them discretionary authority to permit integration of inmates
"insofar as practicable."'
18 6
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding such an interpretation of the YCA
contrary to both the statutory language and legislative history. It stated that
the Bureau's discretion to integrate inmates is limited and that section 5011
does not allow the abandonment of all efforts to maintain separate YCA
facilities.18V The court held that as Congress had not expressed an intent to
alter the YCA, the Bureau could not arbitrarily determine that the YCA
approach should be discarded. Any deviation from this approach must
come within the "context of a comprehensive system of institutions and
agencies devoted to youth offenders"' 8 8 and "within the context of substan-
tial compliance with the segregation requirements of the YCA. ... "'89
In the second part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
the Commission lawfully held the YCA inmates after failing to comply with
the YCA provisions relating to parole eligibility of youth offenders' 9° and
unconditional release.' 9 ' The Commission contended that the 1976 Parole
Commission Reorganization Act 192 repealed the parole provisions of the
YCA, permitting it to apply its own parole criteria to all prisoners. The
Commission required each prisoner to serve at least one-third of his term
prior to parole or release.19 3 All youth offenders sentenced to an indetermi-
nate term of six years were, therefore, required to complete at least two years
before being eligible for release or parole.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Commission's procedure disregarded
183. 651 F.2d at 1360-62.
184. Id at 1356.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). This section pertains to treatment of youth offenders under
the YCA and provides in part that:
[tihe Director shall from time to time designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and
agencies under the control of the Department of Justice for treatment. Insofar as prac-
tical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed
youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders,
and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs
for treatment.
186. The Tenth Circuit went through a lengthy discussion of § 5011 and, in particular, the
construction of the phrase "insofar as practical." It concluded that the phrase modifies all four
of the clauses preceding it which allows the Bureau a limited discretion in granting exceptions
to the norm of segregation. 651 F.2d at 1362-65.
187. Id at 1364.
188. Id
189. Id
190. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976) lists the criteria that are to be considered by the Parole Com-
mission when determining when to release a prisoner on parole. The issue addressed by the
appellate court was whether the YCA required the Commission to consider a youth offender's
rehabilitation under the specific treatment program. 651 F.2d at 1369.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(b) (1976). This section allows the commission to release uncondition-
ally a committed youth offender "at the expiration of one year from the date of conditional
release." Id
192. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 to 4218 (1976).
193. Id § 4205(a).
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the indeterminate sentencing procedure required by the YCA 194 and was
contrary to the law in Dorszynski v. United States. 195 D vrszynski recognized
that the YCA was promulgated in accord with the existing sentencing au-
thority vested in the trial court and was intended to provide the courts with
more sentencing alternatives.19 6 The court found that the Commission had
usurped the sentencing function of the trial courts and, therefore, did not
comply with the purposes and policies of the YCA.
197
The court also noted that, under the YCA and United States v. Ad-
donizio, 198 the Commission has discretionary authority to consider when an
unconditional release may be granted.199 The court held, however, that a
unilateral decision that an inmate is not eligible for parole until serving two




In Runnels v. Hess20 1 the defendant was tried in state court for rape.
2 0 2
In his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's fail-
ure to testify on his own behalf. The defense failed to object and the defend-
ant, Runnels, was convicted. After exhausting his state remedies, Runnels
petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the ground that his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination had been violated. The petition was granted
and the state appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
20 3
Judge Barrett, writing for the court, decided the case by applying Wain-
wright v. .Sykes.204 Sykes held that failure to make a timely objection at a trial
in a state with a contemporaneous objection rule precludes federal habeas
corpus proceedings unless cause can be shown for noncompliance and that
prejudice to the defendant would result. Judge Barrett reasoned that review
based on an inferred fundamental error exception to the rule would invite
"'sand-bagging,' on the part of defense lawyers, 'who may take their chances
on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their
constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their gamble does not pay
off.' ",205 He stated that Sykes was intended to prevent such sand-bagging
and that "carving out fundamental error exceptions to Sykes would seriously
undermine its force."'20 6 The court remanded the case to determine whether
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
195. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
196. Id at 440.
197. 651 F.2d at 1377.
198. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
199. 651 F.2d at 1378.
200. Id at 1378-79. The court concluded that the Commission's failure to consider the
youth offender's rehabilitative progress and failure to determine "good cause" to release offend-
ers is contrary to the purpose of the YCA and § 4206(a).
201. 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981).
202. See Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932 (Okla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
203. 653 F.2d at 1361.
204. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
205. 653 F.2d at 1363 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977)).
206. 653 F.2d at 1363.
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cause existed for the defendant's failure to timely object.
20 7
Judge Logan dissented, arguing against such a strict application of
Sykes.208 He stated that Sykes must be considered with Heng v. Missisipi
209
which held that procedural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vin-
dication of federal rights unless the procedural rule serves a legitimate state
interest. He noted that the Sykes Court implicitly recognized this principle
by applying Hen;y to determine whether a legitimate state interest existed
before applying the "cause and prejudice" analysis.
2 10
Judge Logan argued that, in Runnel's case, the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule would not serve a legitimate state interest. 21 ' He stated that the
state's interest in finality and efficiency in the administration of justice are
not served by requiring contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's clos-
ing argument because an objection would have resulted in a mistrial. 2 12 He
then noted that, based on the circumstances of the case, sand-bagging was
unlikely.2 13 Finally, Judge Logan argued that if prevention of sand-bagging
is considered to be a sufficient state interest, then the requirements of Henry
would always be met and rendered meaningless.
2 14
H. Trial Matters
1. Reviewing a Judgment of Acquittal
In United States v. Whtle21 5 the defendant, White, was found guilty of
mail fraud 2 16 and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained
money.2 1 7 The trial judge set aside the verdict and granted White's motion
for a judgment of acquittal.2 18 The prosecution appealed, contending that
the judge erred by applying the standard of review established in Curlg v.
United States21 9 which, it argued, conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's position
207. Id. at 1364. The court in Part A of its opinion agreed with the district court that the
prosecutor's remarks during closing argument had violated Runnel's fifth amendment rights.
Thus, the prejudice element of the exception had already been shown. The court suggested that
the cause element might be met by a showing of" 'ineffective counsel short of that necessary to
make out Sixth Amendment claim .... . Id (quoting Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172, 177 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
208. 653 F.2d at 1365 (Logan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
210. 653 F.2d at 1366 (Logan, J., dissenting).
211. Id
212. Id. at 1367.
213. Id. at 1367-68.
214. Id. at 1367.
215. 673 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1982).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) prohibits one from developing and sending through the mail
system "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
pretenses, [or] representations . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or at-
tempting so to do .... "
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) prohibits transporting "in interstate.., commerce any goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to
have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud .
218. 673 F.2d at 301.
219. 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). In Curle the court held that,
in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must weigh the evidence in light
of the jury's determination of credibility and draw justifiable inferences which would result in a
reasonable person finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 160 F.2d at 232.
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on judicial review of evidence.220 The Tenth Circuit held that the trial
court had used the appropriate standard of review; however, it found that
the stapdard was erroneously applied.
2 2 1
By viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict
on both counts of the indictment. 222 It reversed the judgment of acquittal
which was based on the failure to establish the first element of mail fraud.
2 23
The court found that sufficient evidence existed to justify a verdict that
White participated in a "scheme or artifice to defraud investors by use of
false representations or promises.
'224
The evidence revealed that White solicited investments in a partnership
to drill and rework oil wells. White represented that he held drilling and
reworking rights to oil leases on three separate properties and that he had
experience in the steam method of oil recovery. The evidence, however, in-
dicated that White had assigned his interest in these properties prior to the
formation of the partnership. 22 5 It was also revealed that White had never
actually used the steam method of recovery but had merely observed its
use.
226
Based upon White's representations, five investors contributed funds to
the partnership. After the partnership was formed, White spent several
months constructing a trailer near the wells to hold the steam recovery unit.
White then withdrew a substantial sum of money from the partnership ac-
count, converted it into cashier's checks, and cashed them in another state.
The partners heard nothing from White until his arrest ten months later.
227
The trial judge believed that White's efforts to construct the trailer were
sufficient to cause a reasonable doubt about his intent to devise a fraudulent
scheme. However, the Tenth Circuit held that such a belief "would not jus-
tify false or baseless representations"2 28 and found that the jury could rea-
sonably have inferred from the evidence that White falsely misrepresented
material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.229
2. Judicial Grant of Witness Immunity
In United States v. Hunter23 ° the defendant called a witness to testify in
220. The standard applied in the Tenth Circuit for judicial consideration of a motion for
acquittal is to review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, allowing a
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 673 F.2d at 301 (citing Maguire v.
United States, 358 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966); Cartwright v.
United States, 335 F.2d 919, 921 (10th Cir. 1964)).
221. 673 F.2d at 301.
222. Id at 304.
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224. 673 F.2d at 304.
225. Id at 302-04.
226. Id at 304.
227. Id
228. Id at 305.
229. Id; 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction for transporting more than $5,000 in interstate commerce with knowl-
edge that the money had been fraudulently appropriated. 673 F.2d at 305.
230. 672 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1982).
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support of his duress defense. The witness invoked her fifth amendment
right to remain silent after the prosecution refused to grant her immunity.
Hunter contended that this denied him the opportunity to develop his
defense.
23 t
In conflict with the weight of authority, the defense urged the court to
adopt the standard in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith.232 In Smith the
Third Circuit held, based on United States v. Herman,233 that when the prose-
cution refuses to grant immunity, the court may grant it under two circum-
stances. First, the court could force the prosecution to grant immunity or
face an acquittal if it deliberately denies immunity in an attempt to distort
the evidentiary conclusions. 23 The court could also grant immunity based
on its "inherent authority" to promote the defendant's due process rights. 235
The Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that a court has inherent author-
ity to grant immunity "under the guise of due process."'2 36 Instead, it ap-
plied the law in United States v. Graham237 in which it was held that the
granting of witness immunity is confined to the United States Attorney and
his superior officers. The court did not comment on the other circumstance
mentioned in Smith,238 therefore, it is unclear whether the Tenth Circuit
would accept a judicial grant of witness immunity in the circumstance of
prosecutorial misconduct.
3. Grand Juries
In another immunity case, Sutton v. United States239 the defendant was
the controlling officer of a company which was under investigation by a fed-
eral grand jury. Certain documents held by the company's attorney were
subpoenaed; however, the grand jury's term expired before the documents
could be reviewed. The trial court ordered the evidence transferred to a
newly empaneled grand jury which never issued a subpoena for the docu-
ments. The defendant challenged the transfer.
240
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Kerr of the District of Wyoming
compared the facts of Sutton to those in United States v. E.H. Koester Bakery
Co. ,24I where the transfer of documents between grand juries was permitted
despite the absence of both a subpoena and a court order. Judge Kerr stated
that to require the issuance of a second subpoena "would simply result in a
complete waste of judicial time." 242 He agreed with the statement in United
231. Id. at 818.
232. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
233. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Heman the court
reviewed the circumstances in which a defendant may request that use immunity be applied
and recognized the two situations promoted in Smith. 589 F.2d at 1204.
234. Smith, 615 F.2d at 968.
235. Id. at 969-70.
236. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 818.
237. 548 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1977).
238. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 818.
239. 658 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1981).
240. Id at 783.
241. 334 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1971).
242. 658 F.2d at 784.
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States v. Kleen Laundry and Cleaners, Inc. :243 "That a different grand jury from
the one which subpoenas the evidence is presented with that evidence is of
little import. This procedure is common."244
4. Selective Prosecution
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of selective prosecution of tax
protesters in United States v. Amon. 24 5 The defendants were convicted of filing
false withholding allowance certificates. They appealed, contending that
they were singled out for prosecution because they were "outspoken" 246 in
their opposition to the tax system and that such selection violated their first
amendment rights.
Judge Holloway, writing for the court, ruled against the defendants.
2 4 7
He agreed with the trial court that the standards articulated by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Berrios,248 applied to tax cases in United States v.
Johnson249 and endorsed by the Tenth Circuit in Barton v. Malley, 250 should
be applied. These standards require that the defendant prove that he had
been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated had not gen-
erally been proceeded against for the type of conduct forming the basis of
the charge against him. He must also prove that the government's discrimi-
natory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith
and has been based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or
the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. 251 Judge Holloway
held that the infringement on the defendants' first amendment rights was
insufficient to show an impermissible purpose in the prosecution. Thus, the
second prong of the Berrios test had not been met.
252
In a vigorous dissent, Judge McKay argued that singling out the de-
fendants because of their protest activities constituted an impermissible pur-
pose for prosecution. 25 3 He stated that the trial court's findings showed that
the second prong of the test had indeed been met and warned that "[t]he net
[effects] of the majority's handling of this issue are. . . the establishment of
a rule which permits government through selective prosecution to chill the





243. 381 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
244. Id. at 523.
245. 669 F.2d 1351 (1Oth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
246. 669 F.2d at 1355.
247. Id at 1359. Judge Logan concurred in a separate opinion. Id at 1359-61.
248. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
249. 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978).
250. 626 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1980).
251. Amon, 669 F.2d at 1356 n.6.
252. The appellate court did not reach the question of whether the first prong of the Berrmes
test, requiring a showing that others similarly situated were not prosecuted, had been met. Id.
at 1357 n.7.
253. Id. at 1361-64 (McKay, J., dissenting).
254. Id at 1362.
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